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Purpose and Extent of the Attorney-
Client Privilege in Louisiana
The rules which require the exclusion of evidence are gen-
erally designed to promote the finding of truth by shielding the
trier of fact from unreliable information and from testimony
which could arouse unwarranted prejudice.1 However, when a
privilege is asserted, valuable information may be withheld from
the trier of fact and the discovery of truth may therefore be im-
paired.2 The attorney-client privilege allows a client to exclude
from evidence professional communications which are confiden-
tial between himself and his attorney.8 By invoking the privi-
lege, a client may refuse to disclose and may prevent his attor-
ney from disclosing communications which are essential to the
maintenance of their relationship. The purpose of this Comment
is to examine the policy considerations which motivate the recog-
nition of the attorney-client privilege and to investigate the form
it has taken under Louisiana law.4
Nature and Purpose of the Privilege
Since a privilege operates as a limitation on the truth-finding
ability of the trier of fact, sufficient justification must be found
for the impediment before a privilege deserves recognition.5 The
justification for a privilege lies in a desire to foster a confiden-
1. Such rules are often referred to as rules of exclusion, and include inad-
missible hearsay, incompetency, irrelevancy, opinions of non-experts, evidence
which is extremely prejudicial and without great weight, and evidence which is
deemed to be self serving.
2. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 72 (1954).
3. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (3d ed. 1940).
4. A great deal has been written on the subject of the attorney-client privi-
lege and it is the purpose of this Comment to consider only the position taken
by Louisiana in regard to the privilege. Unless there is a Louisiana case or statute
in point, some of the rules applicable to the privilege will be omitted from this
discussion. For a complete statement of the privilege, the reader is advised to
consult one of the standard works on evidence.
5. According to Wigmore, four fundamental conditions must be met before
a privilege deserves recognition. They are:
(1) The communications must originate in the confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit to be gained for the correct disposal
of litigation.
See 8 WIGUORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (3d ed. 1940).
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tial relationship between certain parties so as to encourage the
communication of any information essential to their relation-
ship.6 A relationship which is granted the protection of a privi-
lege should be one which society desires to promote and one
which requires an element of confidence for its maintenance and
success.7 It should also appear that the limitation imposed upon
the discovery of the truth does not overshadow the benefits
which accrue to the relationship because of the existence of the
privilege.8 Today, legislatures have granted privileges to many
relationships which were not protected by the common law.9
In order to give a client competent legal protection and ad-
vice, an attorney must have a thorough knowledge of the circum-
stances surrounding his client's problem. To encourage the dis-
closure of all of the facts involved, it is necessary for the client
to feel that the information which he relates to the attorney will
not be used as evidence against him.'0 The desire to promote this
confidential relationship between the client and his attorney is
the motivation behind this privilege.
The Attorney-Client Privilege in Louisiana
At common law the attorney-client privilege in criminal
cases is identical to the privilege in civil cases." However,
6. See items (1) and (2) in note 5 supra.
7. See items (2) and (3) in note 5 supra. See also State v. Guagliardo, 146
La. 949, 84 So. 216 (1920). The court used Wigmore's criteria in finding that
there was no privilege which would protect the statement of the prosecution's
key witness and failure of the district attorney to make this statement available
to the defendant was reversible error.
On the point of a privilege for the district attorney, see WHARTON, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 799 (12th ed. 1954). For a statement of the Louisiana Supreme Court
on the privilege of a police officer to withhold the names of his informers, see
In re Kohn, 227 La. 245, 79 So.2d 81 (1955).
8. See item (4) in note 5 supra.
9. Other relationships which have been awarded the protection of a privilege
in Louisiana are: husband-wife, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC art. 461 (1928);
doctor-patient, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 476 (1928) ; priest-penitent, LA.
CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 477 (1928) ; accountant-client, LA. R.S. 37:85 (1950)
insurer-secretary of state, LA. R.S. 22:1120 (1950).
10. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 91 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (3d
ed. 1940). See State v. Johns, 209 La. 244, 249, 24 So.2d 462, 464 (1945)
("This article [speaking of the privilege granted by Article 475 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure], according to its terms, was written for the protection of the
client to shield him against a disclosure of any confession or admission that he
might see fit to make to his attorney in any consultation, had between them.");
Morris v. Cain, 39 La. Ann. 712, 726, 1 So. 797, 808 (1887) ("The privilege . . .
is indispensable for the purposes of private justice."). It is generally conceded
that the value of the privilege is difficult to show abstractly. 8 WioMoRE, EvI-
DENCE 557, § 2291 (3d ed. 1940) : "Its benefits are all indirect and speculative;
its obstruction is plain and concrete."
11. A search of the common law authorities did not reveal any Jurisdiction
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Louisiana provides different attorney-client privileges for civil
and criminal actions. 12 The privilege extended in civil cases first
appeared in the Civil Code of 18251' and now may be found in
Article 2283 of the Louisiana Civil Code. It provides:
"No attorney or counsellor at law shall give evidence of any-
thing that has been confided in him by his client...."
The Crimes Act of 1804 authorized the use of the common law
rules of evidence in criminal cases arising in Louisiana 14 and
the courts have followed the common law in recognizing the
attorney-client privilege. In 1928, an attorney-client privilege
for criminal cases was included in the Louisiana Code of Crim-
inal Procedure as Article 475, which states:
"No legal adviser is permitted, whether during or after the
termination of his employment as such, unless with his
client's express consent, to disclose any communication made
to him as such legal adviser by or on behalf of his client, or
any advice given by him to his client, or any information that
he may have gotten by reason of his being such legal adviser."
It would thus appear that the privilege authorized in criminal
cases is broader than the privilege provided in civil cases, for
the criminal privilege specifically protects information which
the attorney receives from sources other than his client. In ad-
ministering the general principles of both of these articles, the
Louisiana courts have looked to the common law in order to es-
tablish particular rules necessary in the application of the privi-
leges.15
Principles of the Attorney-Client Privilege Which Apply in Both
Criminal and Civil Cases in Louisiana
Under both the criminal and civil statutes, it is clear that
communications from a client to his attorney are privileged. 16
which drew any distinction between the privileges applied in civil and criminal
cases.
12. Compare LA. CIVm CODE art. 2283 (1870) with LA. CODE OF CraM. PRO.
art. 475 (1928).
13. LA. CIVIL. CODE art. 2262 (1825).
14. La. Acts 1804, c. 50, § 33, p. 440: ' . . the rules of evidence and all
other proceedings whatsoever .. . changing what ought to be changed, shall be
except as is by this act otherwise provided for, according to the said common
law." (Emphasis added.)
15. In every case that could be found dealing with the attorney-client privi-
lege in Louisiana, the court has made reference to Corpus Juris, Wigmore, Green-
leaf, or some other common law authority. See LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROc. art.
0.2 (1928), which authorizes the use of the common law when the Code is silent
on a particular point.
16. See note 11 aupra.
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However, only Article 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
specifically protects communications from an attorney to his cli-
ent. Since the common law privilege covers the communications
from the attorney as well as from the client, it is probable that
the communications from the attorney to the client would be
privileged in civil cases arising in Louisiana.17 This seems wise
because the trier of fact could often infer the nature of the cli-
ent's disclosures from the advice and suggestions given by the
attorney to the client. Thus it would normally render the privi-
lege useless if the attorney could be compelled to testify as to his
responses and thereby impliedly reveal the same communications
which are directly protected by the privilege. The Code of Crim-
inal Procedure also specifically protects the communications
made by an agent or other person acting on the behalf of the
client.1 8 Although the attorney-client privilege sanctioned by the
Civil Code is silent on this point, it is believed that the Louisiana
courts will follow the common law which treats the agent's com-
munications as if they had been made by the client himself. 19
The privilege attaches only to communications which are
made during the existence of the attorney-client relationship.20
Such a relationship develops whenever an attorney receives in-
formation in his professional character from one who is seeking
legal advice. 21 The test for determining the existence of such a
relationship is not based on contract or even a definite under-
standing as to fee or employment. 22 Therefore, it would seem
that communications made to an attorney in an attempt to pro-
cure his services are privileged. However, in a 1939 case, the
Louisiana Supreme Court bolstered a decision denying the pro-
tection of the privilege to a defendant's communications by add-
ing: "Furthermore, [the attorney] stated that he refused to ac-
cept employment ... and, therefore, the relation between client
and attorney did not come into existence. ' 23 It is believed that
this statement is unfortunate and would not be followed in a case
17. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 26(3) (b). See also Shanghnessey
v. Fogg, 15 La. Ann. 330 (1860) (dictum).
18. LA. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. art. 475 (1928).
19. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2317 ( 3d ed. 1940).
20. It is evident that any information received before the attorney-client rela-
tionship arose would not be privileged because such information would not have
been confided in him as the attorney.
21. Bailly v. Robles, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 361, 362 (La. 1826) : "The facts com-
municated to obtain this advice cannot be related by the attorney; nor does it at
all alter the case that she did not afterwards employ him." Cf. Succession of
Bonner, 192 La. 299, 187 So. 801 (1939).
22. See note 21 supra.
23. Succession of Bonner, 192 La. 299, 314, 187 So. 801, 805 (1939).
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in which a prospective client makes communications to an attor-
ney acting in his professional character who later declines to
accept the case.24 If an attorney receives communications from a
prospective client, he should be bound by the privilege regardless
of his actual intention .2  Although communications made to the
attorney after the relationship has ended are not privileged, 26
the fact that an attorney-client relationship comes to an end will
not affect the privileged status of communications made during
the existence of the relationship.27 Under the language of the
jurisprudence and that of Article 478 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, once the privilege attaches to a professional com-
munication, it may be withheld from the trier of fact until the
client himself consents to the disclosure. 28 Since the attorney-
client privilege is designed for the benefit of the client, he may
waive its protection at any time.29 The attorney has no interest
in the privilege other than the protection of his client, and, there-
fore, has no right to invoke the privilege for his own protection
after the client has consented to the disclosure. 30
Not all communications between the client and his attorney
are given the protection of the privilege. While there is a desire
to encourage a client to confide all pertinent information to the
attorney so that the attorney will be in a position to give the best
24. Such a result would clearly be in line with the UNIFORM CODE OF EVIDENCB
Rule 26(3) (a), which defines "client" as one who consults a lawyer for the pur-
pose of retaining the lawyer.
25. Bailly v. Robles, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 361 (1826).
26. Williams, Phillips & Co. v. Benton, 12 La. Ann. 91 (1857), which denied
the privilege to information which the attorney received after the attorney-client
relationship had ended.
27. State v. Hazleton, 51 La. Ann. 72 (1860).
28. Succession of Harkins, 2 La. Ann. 923, 926 (1847) : "[T]he seal of law
once fixed upon them remains forever, unless removed by the party himself."
See also Hart v. Thompson's Executor, 15 La. 88 (1840), where the court said
that death of the client did not release the privilege and that it was not necessary
that the client be a party to the suit at bar. Again see Hart v. Thompson's Execu-
tor, supra at 93, where the court said in response to a plea by counsel that the
court "consent" to the disclosure in place of the deceased client, "nor do we under-
stand why the courts should feel themselves authorized to supply the consent of
a client who has died without giving it." It should be noted in the Hart case that
disclosure was sought in order to invalidate a will left by the deceased. A different
result might have been reached if the testimony of the attorney was needed to up-
hold the apparent intention of the deceased. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2329 (3d
ed. 1940).
29. LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 478 (1928). The question of waiver will not
be considered in detail in this paper.
30. State v. Jones, 209 La. 394, 24 So.2d 627 (1945), in which the attorney
was attempting to invoke the attorney-client privilege to withstand a prosecution
for perjury in obtaining witnesses to testify to false information in a divorce
case. The court found that the attorney had no right to rely on the privilege
after the client had consented to the disclosure.
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possible advice,81 there is no basis for protecting public dis-
closures. Therefore, it is required that the communications be
confidential between the attorney and the client.8 2 It has been
held that statements made to an attorney in the presence of op-
posing litigants were not privileged because they were not con-
fidential between the attorney and his client. 3 The name of the
client and the date and nature of the attorney's employment are
not considered confidential communications which deserve the
protection of the privilege. 34 Nor can the attorney-client privi-
lege be used to shield documents or possessions which could be
obtained from the client if he had not placed them in the attor-
ney's possession.85 Another qualification upon the use of the
privilege is that it is not available to protect communications
made to an attorney in an attempt to secure illegal services or to
procure advice for the perpetration of crimes, tortious conduct,
and fraudulent schemes.8 6 While there is a desire to protect dis-
closures which are made to secure a proper defense for past
transactions or misconduct, there is no desire to aid persons who
seek to break the law. 7 When an attorney represents two or
more parties collectively, there is no privilege to withhold com-
munications made by any of the clients in an action which later
arises among themselves.8
Difference Between the Privilege in Civil and Criminal Cases in
Louisiana
While there appears to be no distinction between the privilege
extended by the common law in civil and criminal cases, it has
31. See note 10 supra.
32. 8 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2285(1), 2311 (3d ed. 1940).
33. Rester v. Powell, 120 La. 406, 45 So. 372 (1907). Although the Louisi-
ana courtq have not been presented with the problem, the common law courts have
had much difficulty in determining if the communications lacked the required de-
gree of confidentiality because of the presence of third parties such as relatives
and agents. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2311 (3d ed. 1940).
34. Shanghnessey v. Fogg, 15 La. Ann. 330 (1860), where the attorney was
forced to answer interrogatories propounded to him which concerned the name of
his client and the nature and date of his employment, but was relieved from an-
swering the other interrogatories because they involved privileged material.
35. White v. Bird, 20 La. Ann. 188 (1868), where the attorney was cited as
garnishee by judgment creditor of his client and was compelled to answer.
36. State v. Johns, 209 La. 394, 24 So.2d 627 (1945) (obtaining perjured
witnesses in divorce case) ; State v. Childers, 196 La. 554, 199 So. 640 (1940)
(an attempt to have the attorney probate an illegal will) ; Succession of Bonner,
192 La. 299, 187 So. 801 (1939).
37. Succession of Bonner, 192 La. 299, 314, 187 So. 801, 805 (1939), where
the court said: "The law is clear that a person attempting to engage a lawyer for
an illegal purpose is not entitled to the privilege of having the matter kept con-
fidential."
38. Algiers Mfg. Co. v. Steen, 4 Orl. App. 129 (La. App. 1906) ; Marcuse v.
Kramer, 5 Orl. App. 247 (La. App. 1908).
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been seen that a statutory difference exists between the two
privileges in Louisiana. Under Article 2283 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, as well as under the common law, no privilege is pro-
vided to protect the information and communications which the
attorney receives from third persons not acting as agents for
the client. 9 A somewhat different approach is taken under Ar-
ticle 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That article adopts
the general common law principles of the privilege but, in addi-
tion, protects information which the attorney receives from other
sources as a result of his employment as the attorney.40 Although
the Louisiana Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to com-
ment upon this extension, it would appear that a client can pre-
vent the disclosure of any information that the attorney acquires
as a result of his investigation and handling of his client's de-
fense in a criminal case.
It is possible that the Louisiana courts will apply the privi-
lege as extended by the Code of Criminal Procedure in civil cases
and thus protect all information which an attorney receives as
a result of his employment. It could be argued that since the
courts themselves have turned to the common law in working
out the rules for applying the general privilege authorized by
the Civil Code, they would be free to depart from those rules
whenever they see fit to do so. 41 Under this approach the com-
mon law rule which denies the privilege to communications com-
ing to the attorney from persons other than his client or his
agents could be departed from. The courts then might apply the
attorney-client privilege of the Code of Criminal Procedure in
civil cases on the theory that the privilege extended by the Code
of Criminal Procedure represents the latest expression of the
Louisiana Legislature. However, since no amendment to the
Civil Code was made when the privilege was enlarged in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, it is probable that the court will
find that there was no intention to modify the privilege in civil
cases. Such a result was reached by a federal court in inter-
preting another Louisana privilege where it was said that "it
was not the function of the court . .. to transpose the privi-
39. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2283 (1870). The privilege is limited to things con-
fided in the attorney by the client. See dictum in State v. Hazleton, 15 La. Ann.
72 (1860) : "It is true that the counsel may be permitted to give evidence of such
matters, connected with the transaction, when his knowledge is derived aliunde."
See also McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 93 (1954).
40. LA. CODE OF CaM. PROC. art. 475 (1928).
41. For a comment exploring the effect of the Code of Criminal Procedure on




lege allowed by one code into another code without express legis-
lative intent. '
42
Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Louisiana
The Louisiana State Law Institute has recently been com-
missioned by the Legislature to prepare a Code of Evidence
for the State of Louisiana.43 In drafting an attorney-client privi-
lege for the proposed code, the members of the Institute will be
confronted with two major questions. First, can the extension
of the privilege in criminal cases be justified? Second, if the
extension is believed justified, should it be made to apply in civil
as well as criminal cases?
The extension of the attorney-client privilege in criminal
cases to protect information and communications which the
attorney receives from sources other than his client has been
criticized on the grounds that no additional burden should be
imposed upon the court's inquiry into the truth.4 4 It is sub-
mitted, however, that any impediment caused by the extension
is justified by the increased encouragement offered to a
person accused of a crime to make a complete disclosure to his
attorney. The privilege in its common law form encour-
ages a client to consult an attorney and discuss his case freely
because the client knows that his communications are protected
from disclosure. 45 However, since the investigation of the facts
of the case by the attorney himself is essential in the prepara-
tion of a proper defense, the client should also be assured that
incriminating evidence discovered by the attorney will not be
subject to disclosure. Unless the client feels that the attorney
cannot be, forced to reveal the evidence uncovered in his inves-
tigation, the client may withhold some essential informa-
tion from the attorney, fearing that such information could
lead to the discovery of some incriminating evidence. When
provided with a privilege to prevent the disclosure of any
information acquired by the attorney during his employment,
the client has additional incentive to make a full disclosure of
his case. From these communications, the attorney may be able
to uncover evidence which is in fact favorable to his client's
42. Rhodes v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 172 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.
1949), where the court refused to apply the doctor-patient privilege provided by
the Code of Criminal Procedure in a civil case.
43. La. Acts 1956, No. 87, p. 259.
44. McCoMICK, EVIDENCE § 93 (1954).
45. See note 10 supra.
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case or, at least, would apprise him of facts which might be
employed by the prosecution. Thus, the attorney-client privi-
lege in its extended form in criminal cases seems justified
by the greater legal protection which will result from the client's
more complete disclosure to his attorney. It must be remem-
bered that the enlarged privilege only protects information that
comes to the attorney "by reason of his being such legal ad-
viser. ' 46 Therefore, an attorney who witnesses a crime and
later takes up the defense of the accused can still be forced to
testify as to what he saw or heard since this information did
not come to him while acting as the attorney. Since most of
an attorney's testimony in criminal cases may be excluded under
the hearsay rule, the additional limitation placed upon the dis-
covery of the truth is greatly overshadowed by the benefits
derived from the increased encouragement offered to the client
to confide everything in the attorney.
Should the Louisiana Law Institute find that the extension
of the attorney-client privilege in criminal cases is desirable. as
a matter of policy, the possibility of allowing the extended privi-
lege in civil cases will present itself. However, it is believed
that a greater burden upon the discovery of truth would be in-
volved by the extension of the privilege in civil cases. The ex-
tension of the privilege would protect any information which
the attorney receives "by reason of his being such legal ad-
viser. '47 Of course, the mere fact that the attorney was em-
ployed regularly on a retainer basis would not prevent him from
being compelled to testify on matters of which he had first-
hand knowledge. In such a case the knowledge and informa-
tion would not necessarily be acquired as a result of his employ-
ment even though it was received during his employment. How-
ever, it often appears in civil cases that the attorney has par-
ticipated in the negotiations between the parties before the con-
troversy arose and has acquired valuable information which
would be helpful to the court in correctly disposing of the litiga-
tion. Since such information comes to the attorney as a result
of his being employed as attorney, his testimony would be un-
available if the broad privilege of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure were adopted for civil cases. In criminal cases the attorney
is usually not involved until after the act is completed and there-




fore he acquires very little first-hand information which would
be protected from disclosure by the extended privilege.
Also, such an extension in civil cases would conflict with one
of the purposes of the Discovery Statute adopted in Louisiana
in 1952.48 The Discovery Statute generally allows each party in
a civil action to obtain any information which is actually needed
in the preparation of his case, with the restriction that privi-
leged matters are not subject to discovery. 49 Any enlargement
of the attorney-client privilege in civil cases would restrict the
usefulness of the Discovery Statute.50 Thus the Law Institute
will be faced with the problem of determining whether or not
the policy of wide discovery should be limited in preference to a
policy designed to encourage a complete disclosure between a
client and his attorney. It is submitted that the additional bur-
den placed upon the finding of the truth in civil cases cannot be
justified by the value to be gained by the extension of the privi-
lege.
Because the law values a man's liberty more than his prop-
erty, the recognition of more protection in criminal cases than
in civil cases is not uncommon. This is illustrated by the fact
that in a civil action a man may be subjected to liability if his
wrong is proved by a preponderance of evidence, 5' while in
criminal prosecutions a man's guilt must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. 52 Then, too, the accused in a criminal case
may protect himself against self incrimination by refusing to
take the stand,53 while a party involved in a civil action can be
compelled to testify and to answer questions which may expose
him to civil liability.5 4
48. LA. R.S. 13:3741-3794 (1950).
49. LA. R.S. 13:3782 (1950).
50. If the privilege were enlarged, so as to include all information coming to
an attorney as a result of his employment, some information which now may be
obtained upon the showing of proper cause would be beyond the range of dis-
covery. Statements of witnesses who are no longer available, taken by opposing
counsel, could not be reached through discovery. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495 (1947), where the court indicated that written reports of witnesses, taken
by counsel, could be obtained by the opposing counsel upon the showing of good
cause because this information was not protected under the attorney-client privi-
lege. See LA. R.S. 13:3782 (1950), which adopts the Hickman v. Taylor rule.
51. Perez v. Meraux, 201 La. 498, 9 So.2d 662 (1942) ; Adams v. Germain &
Boyd Lumber Co., 130 La. 920, 58 So. 815 (1912).
52. State v. Kelley, 225 La. 495, 73 So.2d 437 (1954) ; State v. Mizell, 208
La. 66, 22 So.2d 827 (1945) ; State v. Elby, 145 La. 1019, 83 So. 227 (1919).
53. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 641 (3) (1928).
54. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 349 (1870) ; LA. R.S. 13:3662-3664 (1950).
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Conclusion
In general, Louisiana statutes and cases involving the attor-
ney-client privilege parallel the privilege recognized by the com-
mon law. However, Louisiana has enlarged the privilege in
criminal cases by protecting all information which the attorney
receives as a result of his employment. It is submitted that
the difference in scope between the privilege in civil and crim-
inal cases is justified and that this distinction should be retained
in the proposed Code of Evidence.
William H. Cook, Jr.
